Spy vs Spy
Wednesday, February 23, 2005 at 09:08AM
One of the critical issues of post 9/11 America has been bureaucratic
failure, especially in intelligence, first with respect to the 9/11
attack itself and with respect
to the Iraq War. These failures are now well documented, but a
subtext, a theme running through out the reviews and investigation are
the sometime subtle, sometimes obvious attempts to shift blame.
It is absolutely true that the primary function of any bureaucrat is to
cover his or her own ass. This is the most innocuous form of
bureaucracy: merely self-interested. One level up on the
bureaucratic evolutionary scale is the agenda-driven bureaucrat.
In case anyone fell asleep during the run up to the invasion of Iraq,
Joe Wilson and wife would be very public, though perhaps not the most
extreme examples of this type.
There are Republicans and Democrats in the US
government. Employees of the federal government are not supposed
to have any overt ties to political parties. As individuals, they
can give to campaigns but they can't publicly endorse anyone.
They are supposed to be functionally apolitical. This is
desirable
for a lot of reasons, and one gets the impression that most of the
governed believe that this is the case. That leads the public to
believe that when a functionary from the CIA or the State Department
testifies before Congress or the 9/11 Commission that they are neutral, dispassionate, and therefore
honest. Readers, please discard this extremely naive
notion.
At the top, all bureaucracies are concerned with politics, but with
respect to our foreign policy, two cabinet-level agencies/departments
stand out as having historically been filled with left-leaning, highly
agendized bureaucrats. These would be the State Department and
the CIA. If one doesn't wish to plow through the mountain of
evidence from the checkered history of the State Department (Witness by Whittaker
Chambers is a good starting point, followed by the first several
chapters of Treason
by Ann Coulter), you may delve into the processes
by which the State Department puts into effect a "go slow"
approach so that when it is vital that we move quickly, in say, Iraq's
reconstruction, positions don't get filled, people don't get hired, so
projects don't get put forward, so money that is budgeted doesn't get
spent, so that legislators and the media can say all kinds of things
about how poorly things are going in Iraq and we haven't even spent the
money we've earmarked. This in turn bolsters the scurrilous
accusation that we are just in it for the oil and we don't really have
an interest in the stability and prosperity of Iraq per se.
To be continued...
bbmoe |
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